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ABSTRACT 
The paper’s main purpose is to assess the short-, medium- and long-term sustainability of fiscal 
policy in the great majority of the EU and non-EU member states in the Mediterranean Region. 
By using mainstream (primary fiscal gap) theory (proposed by Buiter (1983) and Blanchard 
(1990)), the difference between the required primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio and the actual 
primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio is calculated for selected Mediterranean countries. Based 
on simple mainstream theory measures of fiscal sustainability, the results indicate that fiscal 
sustainability seems to be a problem in many Mediterranean countries, particularly in Greece, 
Italy and France (in the EU Mediterranean region) as well as in Croatia, Egypt, Lebanon and 
Turkey (in the non-EU Mediterranean region). However, since the paper is dealing with an ex 
ante analysis on the grounds of ex post algebra of sustainability some caution should be 
exercised. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal sustainability has recently drawn greater attention in the enlarged EU. Indeed, the EU 
fiscal framework, fiscal discipline has been an important support for the implementation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this respect, the existence of sound fiscal policies in 
the EU Member States in Mediterranean region is seen as a necessary objective for individual 
countries to pursue. It is not possible to exclude adverse responses from the financial markets 
when fiscal behaviour is deemed to be unsustainable. Moreover, the Treaties governing the EU 
also require sustainable public finances. Countries are urged to comply with the budgetary 
requirements of EMU, by avoiding excessive deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60 percent 
of GDP reference value, and respecting the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
Additionally, stable public finance is an explicit criterion for some prospect EU Mediterranean 
economies’ eligibility for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
On the other hand, the non-EU Member States in Mediterranean region have many features in 
common with other emerging market economies, such as a high exposure to real economy and 
financial shocks and susceptibility to financing constraints, but also exhibit a number of specific 
fiscal issues and challenges. Although the non-EU Mediterranean economies appear largely 
heterogeneous, including on fiscal issues, some challenges are common to most of the countries 
in this region. These include relatively high public debt, dependence on some form or another of 
donor support or concessional financing, high defense expenditure and weak tax bases. In 
addition, in most countries there is room to improve public finance management in order to 
achieve better fiscal outcomes. Notwithstanding progress in many countries, fiscal vulnerabilities 
appear as key risks to maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability in the region. 
 
In economic theory fiscal policy is a crucial factor in determining a country’s overall economic 
performance via its effects on allocation, stabilisation and distribution, and constitutes a key 
component of macroeconomic policies alongside monetary and exchange rate policy. The most 
common way of assessing a given economy’s fiscal position is to analyze its fiscal sustainability, 
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namely a ‘sustainable’ level of the fiscal imbalance that is consistent with solvency, i.e. one 
satisfies the criterion that the total public debt to GDP ratio should not increase. While the 
original literature on fiscal sustainability mostly focused on industrial countries (see Blanchard, 
1990) these days there area few contributions, like this one, that focus on fiscal sustainability in 
selected Mediterranean countries (for some early attempts, see Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 
2003, Aristovnik and Berčič, 2007, Berenger and Llorca, 2007, and Sturm and Gurtner, 2007 
etc.). Work closely related to ours includes Pasinetti (2000) and builds upon some previous 
similar attempts for new EU Member States (see Fanizza and Mourmouras, 1994) in the 
following important direction, i.e. an assessment of short-term, medium-term and long-term 
general government fiscal sustainability for sixteen countries from Mediterranean region based 
primarily on 2006 data and/or average data for the 2003-2006 period. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the concept of fiscal sustainability 
and discusses its key definitions and the main sustainability indicators proposed by the theoretical 
and empirical literature. The empirical framework and results of the estimations of selected 
indicators under a variety of assumptions are presented in Section 3. The final section provides 
concluding remarks and some policy implications.     
 
2. Theoretical Background And Empirical Methodology 
 
To decide whether a country needs to reduce its debt requires assessing if a country suffers from 
a solvency problem. The intertemporal solvency criterion does however impose some limits on 
the behavior of the non-interest fiscal balance (i.e. the primary fiscal balance). Such a solvency 
constraint implies that the discounted value of primary fiscal balances should be at least equal to 
the initial government debt; if a government is initially running primary fiscal deficits and has a 
stock of foreign debt it needs to run primary fiscal surpluses over time to remain solvent. More 
specifically, as long as the discounted value of government debt is non-zero in the infinite limit, 
the public sector is solvent. This only means that the government cannot increase its debt faster 
than the real interest rate on this debt.  
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However, the theoretical criteria for government solvency are quite loose. Indeed, the IMF (2002) 
and Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) suggest that solvency is only a necessary condition for 
sustainability because solvency could be achieved with very large and costly future adjustments. 
Therefore, a non-increasing government debt to GDP ratio is seen as a practical sufficient 
condition for sustainability, i.e. a government is likely to remain solvent as long as the ratio is not 
growing. So, we can define a policy stance as sustainable if a borrower is expected to be able to 
continue servicing its debt without an unrealistically large future correction to the balance of 
income and expenditure (IMF, 2002). Moreover, this criterion is related to the so-called fiscal 
primary gap, which is the difference between the actual fiscal primary balance and the primary 
balance required to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio. Simple accounting identity helps shed light on 
the fiscal sustainability issue. According to Hemming and Miranda (1991) and Roux (1993) the 
(short-term) budget constraint is represented as: 
 
tttttttttt YRYBYDgrYD ///)(/ 1 ++−=∆ −         (1) 
 
where Dt, Yt, Bt, Rt stand for total public debt, nominal GDP, nominal primary (negative) balance 
of the public sector (i.e. the gap between non-interest expenditure and total revenue) and a 
residual factor applicable to the public sector, respectively. In addition, rt represents the real 
interest rate applicable to the public sector and gt the real economic growth rate. Note that the 
first part of the right-hand area in equation (1) refers to the interest component of government 
expenditure ((rt - gt)/ Dt-1/Yt)). Indeed, when rt > gt this indicates upward pressure on the 
debt/GDP ratio, while rt < gt indicates downward pressure. On the other hand, the remaining part 
of the right-hand area indicates the non-interest flows of government. If it is negative, the 
government is running a primary surplus, implying downward pressure on the debt/GDP ratio. If 
it is positive, the government is running a primary deficit, putting upward pressure on the 
debt/GDP ratio. Depending on the magnitude and signs of both right-hand parts there will be a 
net positive or negative effect on the debt/GDP ratio.     
 5 
 
When assessing the fiscal sustainability issue, the main priority is to indicate whether a 
continuation of the present policy stance (as expressed in the present relationship between 
expenditure and revenue levels) would cause the debt/GDP ratio to explode, implode or remain 
stabile. Here, Bispham (1987) developed a set of equations that satisfies this need. If interest is 
paid and the primary deficit (b=Bt/Yt) is a constant ratio of GDP, the overall public deficit ratio is 
not constant. Hence, interest payments can cause the overall public deficit to change. What 
happened to the debt/GDP ratio depends on the relationship between the interest rate, r, and the 
economic growth rate, g, which can be presented as (if g > r):    
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When r > g the change in the debt/GDP ratio depends on the size and sign of the initial debt/GDP 
ratio and the primary balance. If there is initial public debt and primary deficit, the debt/GDP 
ratio explodes as t → ∞ (fiscal policy is unsustainable). On the other hand, if government runs a 
primary surplus and has no initial debt (or have even initial net claims) then the government has 
an explosive net worth position. Although this situation is unlikely to appear in reality the fiscal 
policy will also be unsustainable. However, if we want to estimate the (un)sustainability position 
when the first and third right-hand terms operate in opposite directions, we have to determine if: 
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Thus, according to the presented equations, to establish (short-run) sustainability a government 
should run a primary surplus sufficient enough to cover the excess caused by the real interest rate 
over real growth rate, i.e. a sustainable primary surplus (Mourmouras, 1994), which can be 
presented as (Gonzalez-Paramo et al., 1992): 
 
                      tttttt YDgrYB /)(/ 1−−=−            (5) 
 
Unsustainability is indicated as a position where the real interest rate, rt, exceeds the real 
economic growth, gt, and where the primary balance, Bt, is persistently either in deficit or in a 
surplus not large enough to cover the excess of the real interest rate over the real growth rate. In 
addition, Buiter (1985) suggested an alternative indicator of sustainability which depends on the 
difference between the actual primary surplus and the surplus that stabilizes the net government 
wealth (as a ratio to GDP). However, this indicator is hard to apply since a government’s net 
worth is very difficult to measure.  
 
On the other hand, in order to measure medium-term and long-term tax gaps (Blanchard, 1993) 
and the sustainable conventional public balance alternative indicators have been introduced. For 
example, a sustainable budget deficit (-GOVBt) is derived from equation (5) and equals the 
growth rate multiplied by the debt ratio: 
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Moreover, because equation (6) ignores the relationship between the real interest rate and the real 
economic growth rate the conventional deficit is too crude a measure to use when analyzing the 
sustainability of fiscal policy. Therefore, the medium-term tax gap (t
*
n – t) can be taken as an 
alternative, where the real interest rate, real economic growth rate and projected path of no-
interest expenditure are taken as given. In this respect, the required tax rate necessary to stabilize 
the debt/GDP ratio is as follows (Blanchard, 1993): 
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where exp, trf and n stand for government expenditure, transfers (both as a ratio to GDP), and the 
numbers of years over which govexp and trf are incurred, respectively. However, equation (7) 
holds if the values of n and (r – g) are not large. The long-run tax gap is similar to the medium-
term tax gap. However, it is specified for a period of 30-40 years and allows for factors that 
change expenditure (e.g. demographics) (see Wickens, 1992). 
 
Indeed, equations (2)-(7) provide a set of satisfied test indicators to determine the potential 
unsustainability of public finance given that the current (primary) public balance is maintained 
and that the interest rate and economic growth rate are on a stable (medium-run) path. 
Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that fiscal policy is only sustainable is the assumptions 
made about the variables hold. Therefore, caution must be exercised when setting the 
assumptions of the model. 
 
3. The empirical framework 
 
3.1. Assumptions and Data 
 
First, we estimate public finance sustainability for sixteen Mediterranean economies, i.e. Cyprus, 
France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain and Slovenia (the EU Member States) and Albania, Croatia, 
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syrian AR, Tunisia and Turkey (the non-EU Member States).
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However, in order to calculate a sustainable level of their fiscal balances some assumptions must 
be made. Indeed, this exercise is, by its nature, quite sensitive to the various assumptions made 
about what is the steady state of the economies under consideration. Arbitrarily, the steady state 
                                                           
2
 Due to data deficiencies Algeria, Libyan AJ, Palestine and Montenegro (new state, established June 3, 2006) were 
not included in the sample.  
 8 
for Mediterranean countries is considered to reflect the following historical values of the key 
variables: 
- the equilibrium level of public debt (D/Y) is assumed to be for 2006 (for the short-term 
period and long-term period) or the average of the 2003-2006 period (for the medium-
term period) (IMF data); alternatively, it is assumed for all sampled economies that 
governments are comfortable tolerating a debt ratio of 60 percent (D/Y
*
);  
- the nominal (i) or real interest rate (r) is the effective interest rates on public debt in 2006 
(short-term) or the average in the 2003-2006 period (medium- and long-term) (IMF data); 
- nominal (gn) and real growth projections (g) are the average over the 2007-2012 period 
projection (IMF data) for the medium- and  long-term period. 
 
The empirical results are summarized in the next sub-section. First, the short- and medium-term 
sustainability of public finance is checked by applying the methodology suggested by Fanizza 
and Mourmouras (1994). The results for the selected Mediterranean countries, including the 
scenario dynamics of the public debt to GDP ratio in the five- and ten-years period, are reported 
in Tables 1 and 2. Second, the methodology of Wickens (1992) and Blanchard (1993) is applied 
to calculate long-term public balance sustainability levels for the Mediterranean countries. 
Empirical results are reported in Table 3.   
 
3.2. Empirical results  
 
In this subsection we apply equations (4)-(6) in order to assess fiscal sustainability in the selected 
EU and non-EU Member States in the Mediterranean region. First, we concentrate on the short-
term sustainability of sixteen Mediterranean countries. In Table 1, the first three columns (1-3) 
show the relevant magnitudes (public debt/GDP ratio, nominal rate of growth, and nominal 
interest rate) for calculation of a sustainable level of the primary public balance. Thus, columns 4 
and 5 show the computation of equation (2) as applied to each Mediterranean country. Each 
figure represents the maximum fiscal deficit each country can sustain. More precisely, it indicates 
the maximum hypothetical ratio between the fiscal deficit and GDP that each Mediterranean 
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country can afford, while keeping a non-increasing public debt/GDP ratio. Columns 7 and 8 show 
the gap between the corresponding calculated (columns 4 and 5) and actual primary fiscal 
balance (column 6). Since each year’s deficit increases the outstanding public debt, the higher is 
the (positive) gap between the actual fiscal deficit and the hypothetical fiscal deficit the higher 
the speed at which the public debt decreases.   
 
Table 1 shows the results of fiscal sustainability based on equation (2). In 2006, the actual (short-
term) sustainable fiscal levels seem to be higher than calculated one, if we consider actual public 
debt in the great majority of Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, if we take into 
consideration the targeted public debt (i.e. 60 percent of GDP), then the calculated (permitted) 
average primary fiscal deficit is almost the same as the actual one and the gap between the actual 
and calculated deficit amounts to 0.1 percentage points on average. However, this average covers 
the substantial differences between the countries. Thus, the short-term fiscal policy stances of 
Italy (within the EU Member States), and Lebanon and Syrian AR (the non-EU Member States) 
seem to be extremely unsustainable. On the other hand, by far the most favourable position is that 
of Spain (the EU Member States), and Morocco and Israel (the non-EU Member States). Indeed, 
Spain has the highest positive primary balance in the region, i.e. 3.5 percent of GDP (in 2006). In 
the other Mediterranean region (the non-EU countries), only Israel, Morocco and Turkey seem to 
have a sustainable short-term primary fiscal deficit. In general, the EU Member States seem to 
have more favourable short-term fiscal position (probably due to the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP)) than the non-EU Member States in the Mediterranean region. 
 
However, the preceding employment of (short-term) fiscal sustainability indicator may give a 
distorted picture of the amount of adjustments that would reasonably be required for different 
reasons. Indeed, the calculated (primary) fiscal balances (as a GDP ratio) can be distorted by, for 
example, speeding up privatization receipts (if the privatized assets would have yielded a positive 
future net cash flow to the government) or by cutting back government capital formation (if the 
present discounted value of the future net cash flow to the government would be positive). In 
addition, Buiter (1985) pointed out two further weaknesses of the one-period primary gap 
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indicator. The first emphasizes that the actual current primary fiscal balance could be affected by 
cyclical increases or reductions in public sector revenues and/or expenditures. The second states 
the current nominal interest rate and growth of nominal GDP may be unrepresentative of their 
respective long-term expected average values. Hence, the need for medium- and long-term 
perspectives emerges, which are adopted in the rest of this paper.     
 
Thus, we gauged the medium-term fiscal sustainability of the same sixteen Mediterranean 
countries. Given the set assumptions presented in the previous subsection the primary public 
balance seems to be medium-term sustainable for most of the EU Member States in the 
Mediterranean region (the exceptions are Italy and France). Indeed, their actual primary balances 
as a percentage share of GDP (2003-2006 averages) are relatively favourable, fluctuating 
between -0.7 (Italy) and 2.8 (Spain). The less favourable (calculated) primary fiscal balance, 
namely in Italy, can chiefly be explained by the fact that this economy has been projected to have 
the lowest average growth rates of real GDP (1.5 percent p.a. on average) and one of the highest 
levels of real effective interest rates among all EU Member States in the Mediterranean region 
(2.0 percent). On the contrary, Spain is confronted with the lowest real effective interest rates (1.0 
percent). Similar to the EU Member States, few of the non-EU Member States countries show 
unsustainable medium-term fiscal policy stance (i.e. Turkey, Lebanon and Croatia). While 
Croatia has an excessive primary fiscal deficit primarily due to relatively moderate real GDP 
growth averages (4.5 percent on average), the highest real effective interest rate is the main 
reason for the unsustainable medium-term fiscal position in Turkey 
3
 (9.9 percent on average) and 
Lebanon
4
 (6.3). 
 
                                                           
3
 The crisis in Turkey (2000-01) led to a sharp increase in net public debt (from 58% of GDP in 2000 to 91% of GDP 
in 2001) as a result of a devaluation of the Turkish lira, the restructuring of the banking sector (i.e. previous 
contingent liabilities became public and recession following the crisis (see Sturm and Gurtner, 2007).   
4
 Lebanon stands out in the Mediterranean region as the country with the lowest fiscal revenue in the region (around 
22 percent of GDP in 2006), pointing to difficulties in generating sufficient revenue to cover public expenditure, 
which is one of the reasons for the country’s high deficits over the last years and the accumulation of public debt. 
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Table 1: Short-term fiscal sustainability in the Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Calculated  
(short-term) 
primary public balance  
((i-gn)/(1+gn))*(D/Y) 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Debt  
(D/Y) 
(2006) 
(1) 
 
 
Growth 
rate of 
nom. 
GDP 
(gn) 
(2006) 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nom. 
interest 
rate 
(i) 
(2006)  
(3) 
 
 
 
Actual 
public 
debt 
assumpt. 
(4) 
Targeted 
public 
debt 
assumpt. 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
(5) 
Actual 
primary 
public 
balance  
(-b) 
( 2006) 
(6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculated) 
(actual 
public debt 
assumption) 
(7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculated) 
(targeted 
public debt 
assumption) 
(8) 
EU 
(average) 67.1 3.2 4.5 1.2 0.8 0.9 -0.3 0.1 
Cyprus 69.2
*
 3.9 5.1 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.4 
France 64.2 2.0 4.1 1.3 1.2 0.0 -1.3 -1.2 
Greece  98.0
*
 3.7 4.0 0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
Italy  106.6
* 
 0.1 4.5 4.7 2.6 0.4 -4.3 -2.2 
Malta 64.0 3.3 5.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Spain 39.8 3.9 4.0 0.0 0.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 
Slovenia 28.2 5.2 4.4 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.5 0.8 
Non-EU 
(average) 71.9 5.1 6.8 2.1 1.0 0.5 -1.5 -0.5 
Albania 55.9 5.0 5.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 
Croatia 42.5 4.6 5.4 0.3 0.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.1 
Egypt 72.6 7.1 8.0 0.6 0.5 -2.3 -2.9 -2.8 
Israel 86.8 5.2 5.4 0.2 0.1 3.0 2.8 2.9 
Lebanon 178.1 0.1 7.6 13.3 4.5 1.7 -11.6 -2.8 
Morocco 58.2 8.0 5.6 -1.3 -1.3 1.6 2.9 2.9 
Syrian AR 35.9 4.4 3.3 -0.4 -0.6 -4.7 -4.3 -4.1 
Tunisia 54.0 5.4 5.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Turkey 63.1 6.0 15.9 5.9 5.6 6.6 0.7 1.0 
        Note: * Data refers to the year 2005.       
   Sources:  IMF (2008), author’s calculations. 
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Table 2: Medium-term fiscal sustainability in the Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Calculated  
(medium-term) 
primary public balance  
((r-g)/(1+g))*(D/Y) 
Country 
 
Public 
Debt  
(D/Y) 
(2003-06 
averages) 
Growth 
rate of 
real GDP 
(g) 
(2007-12 
averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real 
effective 
interest 
rate 
(r) 
(2003-06 
averages) 
Actual 
public 
debt 
assumpt. 
Targeted 
public 
debt 
assumpt. 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
Actual 
primary 
public 
balance (b) 
( 2003-06 
averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculat.)  
(actual 
public 
debt 
assumpt.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
debt 
(D/Y) 
after 
5 
years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
debt 
(D/Y) 
after 
10 years 
EU 
(average) 66.4 3.0 1.8 -0.6 -0.7 0.3 0.9 62.3 58.8 
Cyprus 68.4 4.0 1.9 -1.4 -1.2 -0.3 1.1 63.1 58.3 
France 64.5 2.2 2.4 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 67.2 70.0 
Greece 84.7 3.2 1.1 -1.7 -1.2 -0.2 1.5 77.2 70.5 
Italy 105.5 1.5 2.0 0.6 0.3 -0.7 -1.3 112.0 118.8 
Malta 68.9 2.7 2.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.6 65.9 63.0 
Spain 44.5 3.5 1.0 -1.1 -1.4 2.8 3.9 25.9 9.5 
Slovenia 28.4 4.1 1.9 -0.6 -1.3 0.2 0.8 24.6 21.3 
Non-EU  
(average) 75.4 5.2 2.7 -0.9 -1.5 -2.3 -1.4 83.4 94.1 
Albania 58.0 6.1 3.1 -1.7 -1.7 -0.6 1.0 53.1 48.8 
Croatia 42.9 4.5 2.0 -1.0 -1.4 -2.9 -1.9 51.7 59.5 
Egypt 78.8 7.5 -1.1 -6.3 -4.8 -2.8 3.5 63.8 53.9 
Israel 96.1 4.0 5.1 1.0 0.6 -1.3 -2.3 107.9 120.4 
Lebanon 173.1 4.2 6.3 3.5 1.2 -2.7 -6.1 204.9 240.1 
Morocco 61.0 5.3 4.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.4 59.2 57.5 
Syrian AR 36.5 4.2 -7.7 -4.1 -6.8 -3.3 0.8 33.2 31.4 
Tunisia 58.1 6.2 2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -0.2 2.1 48.5 40.7 
Turkey 73.8 5.3 9.9 3.2 2.6 -6.7 -9.9 128.0 195.0 
            Sources:  IMF (2008), author’s calculations. 
 
In addition to the above analysis, special attention is paid to the evolution of the debt to GDP 
ratio for periods of five and ten years. If we assume that a relatively high real GDP growth rate 
and the existing real interest rate (averages over the projection period 2007-12) is maintained, 
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then only the non-EU Member States of the region as a whole face an increase of the average 
public debt to GDP ratio. Indeed, the average public debt to GDP ratio is planned to increase 
from 75.4 percent of GDP to 83.4 percent of GDP after five years and to 94.1 percent of GDP 
after ten years in the selected countries of the Mediterranean region. However, Albania, Egypt, 
Morocco, Syrian AR and Tunisia are planning to have a lower public debt to GDP ratio after a 
10-year period in the considered region under the set assumptions. On the other hand, keeping the 
primary balance ratios at their current levels, Croatia, Israel, Lebanon and in particular Turkey 
would face a rapid debt ratio increase over a projection period of ten years. In the EU Member 
States, the average public debt to GDP ratio is planned to decline from 66.4 percent of GDP to 
62.3 and 58.8 percent of GDP after 5 and 10 years, respectively. There are only two countries 
where public debt is planned to rise under the set assumptions, i.e. France and Italy.
5
 Indeed, in 
these circumstances most of EU Member States expect to lower the public debt to GDP ratio 
significantly in the next decade, in particular Spain.  
 
Finally, we briefly consider long-term fiscal sustainability in both Mediterranean regions under 
consideration. Table 3, because of its similarity to Tables 1 and 2, does not need to be illustrated 
in detail. It refers to equation (6) which helps us reveal the long-term sustainability of public 
finance. The results indicate that practically all Mediterranean countries (except Spain and 
Tunisia) show unsustainable long-term public finance. The group of countries including Cyprus, 
Malta, Slovenia (the EU Member States) and Albania, Israel, Morocco, Turkey (the non-EU 
Member States) face moderate problems with (negative) gaps between the actual and calculated 
fiscal balance of around 1.0 percentage points. However, the most substantial long-term fiscal 
problems might affect Greece and Italy (the EU Members) and Lebanon, Syrian AR and Egypt 
(the non-EU Members).  
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 The results confirm the findings of Frederiksen (2005). 
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Table 3: Long-term fiscal sustainability in the Mediterranean countries 
 
Calculated  
(long-term) 
public balance 
((g*(D/Y))  
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-Calculated) 
 
 
Country 
 
Public 
debt  (D/Y) 
(2006) 
 Growth 
rate of 
real 
GDP  
(g) 
(2007-
12 
project.) 
 
Actual public 
debt 
assumption 
 
 
 
 
 
Targeted 
public debt 
assumption 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual 
public 
balance  
(2003-06 
averages) 
Actual 
public 
balance  
(2006) 
 
Actual public 
debt 
assumption 
_____________ 
Actual public 
balance  
(2003-06 
averages) 
 
Targeted public 
debt assumption 
(60 % of GDP) 
_____________ 
Actual public 
balance 
(2006) 
EU  
(average) 67.1 3.0 -1.9 -1.8 -2.8 -1.7 -1.0 0.2 
Cyprus 69.2
*
 4.0 -2.8 -2.4 -3.7 -1.2 -0.9 1.2 
France 64.2 2.2 -1.4 -1.3 -3.2 -2.4 -1.8 -1.1 
Greece 98.0
*
 3.2 -3.1 -1.9 -5.2 -2.6 -2.1 -0.7 
Italy 106.6
* 
 1.5 -1.6 -0.9 -3.7 -3.4 -2.1 -2.5 
Malta 64.0 2.7 -1.7 -1.6 -3.0 -2.6 -1.3 -1.0 
Spain 39.8 3.5 -1.4 -2.1 0.9 1.8 2.2 3.9 
Slovenia 28.2 4.1 -1.2 -2.4 -1.9 -1.2 -0.8 1.2 
Non-EU  
(average) 71.9 5.2 -3.7 -3.1 -5.2 -4.3 -1.5 -1.2 
Albania 55.9 6.1 -3.4 -3.7 -4.2 -3.2 -0.7 0.5 
Croatia 42.5 4.5 -1.9 -2.7 -4.4 -3.9 -2.5 -1.2 
Egypt 72.6 7.5 -5.4 -4.5 -8.4 -7.7 -3.0 -3.2 
Israel 86.8 4.0 -3.5 -2.4 -4.4 -1.8 -0.9 0.6 
Lebanon 178.1 4.2 -7.4 -2.5 -10.4 -11.1 -3.0 -8.6 
Morocco 58.2 5.3 -3.1 -3.2 -3.9 -2.1 -0.8 1.1 
Syrian AR 35.9 4.2 -1.5 -2.5 -4.2 -5.7 -2.7 -3.2 
Tunisia 54.0 6.2 -3.3 -3.7 -2.9 -2.8 0.4 0.9 
Turkey 63.1 5.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.9 -0.8 -0.6 2.4 
    Note: * Data refers to the year 2005.       
 
   Sources:  IMF (2008), author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The sustainability of public finance has been an important issue for many Mediterranean 
countries in recent years. High fiscal deficits have characterized the economic history of many 
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developed as well as developing countries, including in the Mediterranean region and in the euro 
area. While the non-EU Mediterranean countries exhibit some specific fiscal features and 
challenges, they also face others that are common to many euro area (and other) countries, in 
particular concerning deficits and debt reduction and the maintenance of fiscal discipline. By 
using mainstream (primary fiscal gap) theory (proposed by Buiter (1983) and Blanchard (1990)), 
the analysis for the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean countries ensures some degree of 
restrictiveness. Based on simple mainstream theory measures of fiscal sustainability, the results 
indicate that fiscal sustainability seems to be a problem in many Mediterranean countries, 
particularly in Greece, Italy and France (in the EU Mediterranean region) as well as in Croatia, 
Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey (in the non-EU Mediterranean region). For these economies it is vital 
to maintain relatively high economic growth rate as well as to secure more favorable interest rates 
on public debt in the near future in order to mitigate additional fiscal burdens of unfavourable 
external (e.g. fiscal pressures due to globalisation) as well as internal factors (e.g. demographics). 
 
However, since the paper is dealing with an ex ante analysis on the grounds of ex post algebra of 
sustainability some caution should be exercised. First, all the indicators used in the analysis are 
sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for long-run sustainability. Indeed, it may be sub-
optimal to prevent a country from smoothing its expenditure because this would lead to 
overshooting the fiscal ratio that corresponds to a long-run equilibrium. Second, most of the 
indicators require assumptions about macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP growth, interest rates, 
primary balance etc.) which are implicitly assumed to be exogenous. Finally, a great majority of 
factors (such as demographics, etc.) that characterize the situation in the considered economies 
are not included in these indicators. 
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